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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Alan McCall appeals from

denial of his post-conviction petition

after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
McCall petitioned for post-conviction relief from his conviction for
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (R., p. 5.) All claims
asserted in the petition, save a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to file a motion to suppress, were summarily dismissed by the district
court. (R., pp. 214-25.)
At the evidentiary hearing Officer Stephenson testified that he conducted a
traffic stop of McCall for failing to signal as he merged into traffic from the side of
the road. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 3-24. 1) McCall and one other witness, Timothy Jones,
testified that McCall properly signaled before entering traffic from the side of the
road in front of Jones' house.

(Tr., p. 8, L. 19 - p. 9, L. 1; p. 27, Ls. 9-11.)

Jones's house is on the 600 block of Second Avenue East. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 2-5.)
The location the officer saw Jones pull away from was on the 500 block of
Second Avenue East. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 11-16; p. 46, Ls. 3-24. 2)

1

All "Tr." citations are to the transcript of the September 12, 2011 evidentiary
hearing.
2
The district court took judicial notice of the transcript of the underlying criminal
trial. (R., p. 264.) The court then relied on this transcript, specifically quoting it,
for the proposition that McCall was stopped for pulling into traffic with signaling
on the five-hundred block of Second Avenue East. (R., pp. 269-70.) Because
McCall has not included the transcript of the criminal trial in the record on this
appeal (R., p. 295), this factual finding is not subject to challenge on appeal.

1

McCall testified that he demanded his attorney file a suppression motion
on the ground that he was not ultimately issued a citation for the illegal merger.
(Tr., p. 33, Ls. 7-16.) Jones testified that neither McCall nor his attorneys in the
criminal case contacted him about what he knew about the traffic stop, and he
never talked to anyone about the incident until contacted in relation to the postconviction action. (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 8-11; p. 20, Ls. 8-11; p. 24, Ls. 9-13.) McCall's
criminal trial attorneys confirmed that McCall never told them that Jones had
information about the circumstances of the traffic stop. (Tr., p. 72, Ls. 3-17; p.
83, Ls. 3-7; but see Tr., p. 83, L. 8 - p. 84, L. 4 (did discuss "landlord" who may
have been Jones and may have seen the "incident" with someone else in public
defender's office).) McCall's criminal trial attorneys testified that they reviewed
the police reports and concluded a motion to suppress would be fruitless based
on the officer's report that he saw McCall merge into traffic without signaling.
(Tr., p. 73, L. 6 - p. 74, L. 5; p. 76, Ls. 1-12; p. 82, L. 15 - p. 83, L. 2; p. 85, Ls.
9-20.)
After the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief on the
remaining claim and dismissed the petition with prejudice. (R., pp. 255-74.) The
district court concluded that the "crux" of McCall's claim was that he used his turn
signal when he "pulled away from the residence of Mr. Jones in the 600 block" of
the street. (R., p. 269.) Although Jones did so testify, the officer testified McCall
had pulled out from a drug house on the 500 block, which was corroborated by a

State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) (missing
portions of record presumed to support decision of trial court).
2

prior statement

McCall himself. (R., pp. 269-70.) Jones also testified that

he did not know if McCall might have made an additional stop one block away
before being pulled over.

, p. 269.) The district court concluded that because

there was "no evidence of any suppressible issues" there was no objective
shortcoming in electing to not file a motion to suppress. (R., p. 270.) Likewise,
McCall failed to "show that the motion to suppress would likely have been
granted" and therefore "has not shown prejudice." (R., p. 271.)
McCall filed a notice of appeal timely from the denial of his petition. (R.,
pp. 278-80.)

3

ISSUE

McCall states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred when it denied post
conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, rejecting Petitioner's
assertions that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel?
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
On Appeal McCall asserts that the district court applied an incorrect
Fourth Amendment standard to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In
fact the district court denied his claim because evidence that McCall signaled
while pulling into traffic on the 600 block was irrelevant to whether he pulled into
traffic without signaling on the 500 block as observed by the officer. Has McCall
failed to demonstrate that the district court erroneously found he failed to prove
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
McCall Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erroneously Found
He Failed To Prove That His Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File A
Motion To Suppress
introduction

A

The district court concluded that McCall failed to prove either prong of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

(R, pp. 264-71.)

On appeal McCall

claims "the court found merely that the police officer believed that Mr. McCall
failed to use his turn signal" and therefore decided the case solely on the officer's
"subjective good faith." (Appellant's brief, p. 15.) McCall asserts his whole claim
comes down to "whether the turn signal was used or not" and the court's alleged
failure to make that determination requires a remand. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1517.)

McCall's claim that the district court decided this case solely upon

"subjective good faith" is not supported by the record. To the contrary, the record
establishes that the district court found McCall's evidence of signaling while
pulling into traffic on the 600 block of Second Avenue East was irrelevant to any
suppression motion challenging the officer's decision to stop McCall for a
different traffic infraction (pulling into traffic without signaling on the 500 block of
Second Avenue East). McCall has therefore failed to show error by the district
court.

B.

Standard Of Review
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters

findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings
fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of
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law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998).

The credibility of the witnesses, the

weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson
v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's
decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is
entitled to great weight Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964,
965 (Ct. App. 1990).

C.

McCall's Argument That The Court Denied His Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To File A Suppression Motion Because
Of The Officer's Good Faith Belief Is Belied By The Record
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based.
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135,141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). A petitioner seeking relief
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must prove "that his counsel was
deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice."
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,922,828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989)).
"To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was
competent and diligent." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362,
367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted). To meet this burden "requires showing
6

that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not
be second-guessed on appeal uniess those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective evaluation." Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-54, 177 P.3d at 367-68.
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174,
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App.
1999). Where, as here, the allegedly deficient performance was failure to file a
suppression motion, the petitioner has failed to prove prejudice if the motion
would not have been granted. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634,
637 (Ct. App. 1993); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 407, 775 P.2d 1243, 1249
(Ct. App. 1989).
Here the district court concluded that McCall presented no evidence that a
motion to suppress challenging reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop would
have been granted, because all of McCall's evidence related to him signaling
when he left the curb from his landlord's house on the 600 block of the street, but
the traffic stop occurred when he left the curb at a different location-a drug
house on the 500 block of the street.

(R, pp. 269-70.)

The court rejected

McCall's testimony that he made no stops after leaving the house on the 600
block based on McCall's prior statement that he was stopped after "'pulling away
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from the curb in the 500 Block of Second Avenue East."'

(R., p. 269.)

The

court's finding that evidence of turn signal use on the 600 block was irrelevant to
the question of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion based on failure to
use the turn signal when pulling into traffic from a location on the 500 block was
supported by the evidence and determinative of whether counsel was ineffective
for failing to move to suppress on the basis of that evidence.
In addition, the trial court specifically found that McCall failed to prove "that
trial counsel, by a preponderance of the evidence, did not meet the objective
standards of competence."

(R., p. 270.)

Indeed, there was no evidence

presented that, in making the tactical decision to not bring a suppression motion,
trial counsel failed to review the evidence available, did not understand the
applicable legal standards, or decided not to file the motion because of any other
objective shortcoming. (See Tr., p. 71, L. 13 - p. 88, L. 17.) McCall did not even
present evidence that he, at any relevant time, told his counsel that he was
claiming he had in fact signaled and had a witness to support that claim. (Tr., p.
32, L. 10 - p. 34, L. 18; p. 42, L. 1 - p. 43, L. 18.) Likewise, the district court
found that both trial counsel had concluded there were not "suppressible issues,"
that after reviewing the evidence presented in post-conviction the "court would
have to agree," and that McCall had not shown that the motion to suppress would
likely have been granted. (R., p. 271.)
McCall argues that the district court merely concluded that the officer had
a "subjective good faith" belief that McCall had not used his turn signal, then
argues the court erred by not determining if he in fact used his turn signal.
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(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-23.)

No fair reading of the court's written opinion

supports this argument. The district court clearly found that McCall's evidence of
turn signal use was not relevant to the question of reasonable suspicion for the
stop because it related to a different traffic maneuver, not because the actual
facts leading to the stop did not matter. (R., pp. 269-70.)
In addition, McCall's argument ignores the fact that the issue was not
suppression per se but was instead ineffective assistance of counsel.

At no

point, for example, does McCall even address the district court's finding that
there was no objective shortcoming in counsel's tactical decision to not pursue a
suppression motion. (Compare R., p. 270 with Appellant's brief.)
McCall has failed to show error by the district court. Taking a few lines of
the district court's written opinion out of context, McCall attempts to characterize
the district court's decision as merely accepting the good faith of the police
officer.

This characterization is inaccurate.

Instead, the court held that the

evidence McCall sought to use to challenge his stop did not relate to the events
giving rise to reasonable suspicion for that stop.

In addition, McCall does not

challenge the district court's determination that he failed to prove any objective
shortcoming by counsel or prejudice.

For these reasons McCall has failed to

show error.
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CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district
determination that McCall failed to prove ineffective assistance of
tactical choice to not file a motion to suppress to challenge the basis for the
stop.

DATED this 23rd day of May, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of May, 2012, I caused a true
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GREG S. SILVEY
Silvey Law Office, Ltd.
Attorney at Law
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